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ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION:
OR, ALTRUISM RUN AMUCK

RICHARD

A.

EPSTEIN*

Organ transplant policy is again very much in the
news, and from some of the stories in print, one
might assume that the success of present policies
represents a triumph of altruism over the darker
forces of human nature. Earlier this year, The New
York Times ran two moving stories showing the benefits that donors obtain from making kidney donations. One. story illustrated how the parents of a
seven-year-old boy, killed when a school wall fell on
him, gained some small consolation by donating his
organs to help some other school children to live.'
The second story featured a picture of two healthy
women (one 49 and the other 57) and then related
how the younger woman was able to donate her kidney to a friend by overcoming the reluctance of a
stodgy medical establishment that fears two things
above all: the coercion that might undermine voluntary giving, and payment- yes, payment - for
donated organs.2 Organ donation is easy: "You don't
have to be crazy. You just have to be noble and
altruistic," explained Dr. Norman Fost, an ethicist at
the University of Wisconsin.
Both stories allowed dramatic and moving incidents to conceal a larger and more pressing social
truth. There is today an acute and growing shortage
of usable organs for transplantation. Individual acts
of altruism will not alleviate this shortage in the
future, any more than in the past. In light of the
deaths and suffering that-follow, what is needed is
nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the
laws and practices of organ transplantation. At pre-

* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago. Epstein is now at work on a book on health law
and policy.
Elizabeth Rosenthal, "Parents Find Solace in Donating Organs,"
NYT, 5/11/93 B5, B8.
Gina Kolata, "Unrelated Kidney Donors Win Growing
Acceptance by Hospitals," NYT, 6/30/93 at B6.
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sent the dominant philosophy of organ transplants is
captured by one stark opposition: to give is divine,
but to sell is evil and immoral. The dominant concerns therefore are to make sure that all voluntary
donations are not coerced, so that all errors are made
in favor of not allowing the donation to go forward:
hence the reluctance of the medical establishment
to perform, let alone encourage, live donations
between unrelated parties. Looming largest of all,
however, is opposite side of the coin: the legal prohibition on the sale of organs that is rigidly enforced
no matter how many people die in consequence of
that policy. The first part of this policy is hardly
exceptionable; the second part is fundamentally misguided. Altruism and donation will not make these
shortages disappear. An open market in sales must
be created. Altruism must be supplemented with
market mechanisms that allow the free and untrammeled sale of organs, from live as well as dead organ
donors. A closer look at the current situation helps
explain why.
THE LENGTHENING

QUEUES

At present organ donations come from two sources:
cadaveric and live. First, and most importantly, are
cadaveric donations- that is, those which are made
by (or from) individuals who have just died. It is not
easy for a dead person to qualify as an organ donor.
Persons who have died of illness or disease, persons
who are alcohol and drug users, persons whose organ
have been damaged in an accident, and persons
whose organs have lost efficiency due to age are not
deemed good donors. Neither are the poor and malnourished. The ideal candidates for cadaveric organs
are young individuals, typically male, who have died
from a trauma that leaves their internal organs fit for
use: victims of fatal head injuries from motorcycle
accidents and gunshot wounds yield suitable donors,
so long as the wounded can be kept alive long
enough for their organs to be harvested in hospital.
The supply on organs from this source is constant, or
perhaps shrinking, for fewer people are dying deaths
of this sort. Last year, typical in this regard, some
7,644 kidneys were harvested in this manner. That
number is not likely to rise significantly in the near
future.
Added to the cadaveric kidneys are 2300 volun2

tary donations from live blood related donors. In
general these donations are preferred to cadaveric
donations if only because kidneys from live donors
are more beneficial for the recipient. Yet the transfer is surely more inconvenient for the living donor,
as it requires a major incision, the removal of a rib,
and several weeks of recuperation. The surgery also
carries with it a very small chance for the loss of life
(most recent estimates place it at 1 in 20,000), and
an increased risk of some collateral disorders (e.g.,
high blood pressure) in the later years of life.
Ironically, kidney disorder is not generally placed
high on the risk list because whatever disease condition (e.g., diabetes) renders one kidney dysfunctional is likely to attack both kidneys as well - which is
why there is so great a need for donated kidneys in
the first place. One does not know how many potential blood-related family donors choose not to give;
nor is exactly clear how much social pressure, and
financial inducement take place behind closed doors
for those who do.
What is known however is that the 10,000 or so
kidney donations from these two major sources are
not sufficient to meet the demand. In 1987, the
official waiting list for kidneys was 10,000 persons;
by 1991, after an intensive campaign to increase
the number of voluntary donations, the waiting list
stood at over 18,500; and by 1993 the number had
expanded again to over 23,000 people. These numbers, it should be stressed, substantially understate
the number of persons whose lives could be saved
or bettered by a kidney transplant. The list does
not include people too sick to make any list; nor
does it include those who are taken off the list,
only to die shortly thereafter; nor does it include
the number of people who have died while on the
list, waiting in vain for a needed organ. The official
and public boost for altruism has not increased the
number of organ donors (most of whom can give
two kidneys) substantially.
So beware of glowing reports of altruism in
action. Also, heed the sobering voices of failure that
tell of the forty percent of possible donations that
are not made for one reason or another, and of frustrated specialists able to persuade most of the assembled and distraught family of a dead young man to
donate, only to be thwarted by one distant relative
opposed to the violation of the dead. The bottom
3

line is that technological advances now make many
individuals better donors or recipients than before.
Yet the number of deaths for want of an organ continues, inexorably, to rise. Some very powerful ethical constraint must be at work here to block massive
entrepreneurial efforts from bridging the gap. What?
PROHIBITIONS AND MARKETS

The legal source of our difficulties is not hard to
find. The National Organ Transplantation Act of
1984 makes it a felony punishable by fines up to
$50,000 or five years in prison, "for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation." Its narrow exception only
allows people to recover the expenses of removing,
transplanting, or preserving the organ, as well as for
wages lost incurred during the transfer. Yet there is
nothing offsetting the anxiety or pain and suffering,
or for loss of some of the amenities of life that even
the successful removal of an organ entails. By design,
the law prevents any gains that could flow from the
emergence of an organized market for organ transfers. Instead in textbook regulatory style, the current
prohibition acts as a prelude for a set of dubious but
complex procedures designed to expand the supply
of organs: some statutes require physicians to make
requests of a decedent's family for use of the organs;
some proposals even presume consent to donation
when no opposition has been expressed. Yet both of
these strategies work, if at all, only for cadaveric
transplants. As resistance in many cases is high, and
the number of traumatic deaths is constant or
declining, the complete harvest of every usable
organ would still leave shortages relative to the
incessant demand. What else should be done?
The current legal constraints dictate the possible
responses. On the supply side, more exhortation,
which does work - occasionally. But the eighty-six
reported donations between unrelated donors are
only a small drop in a big bucket, and it is unlikely
that this humber will expand substantially even if a
dozen more favorable feature stories are written. So
given shortages, someone has to ration the organs in
question. The nonprice mechanisms available to the
federal government are surely inadequate. James
Blumstein of Vanderbilt Law School rightly stresses
4

the tension between private and public control over
donations. Do individuals have the right to select
the recipients of organs, by name or by group, or are
all organs thrown into a large public pool, to be then
allocated by the impersonal criteria (tissue matches
and lotteries) usually reserved for these occasions?
Treating all organs as "national resources" in
some impersonal pool reduces the incentive for giving that comes when the donor knows, and takes
an interest in, the welfare of the recipient. The
powers that be in Washington (chiefly an outfit
known as UNOS, United Network of Organ
Sharing, whose communal title accurately reflects
its working philosophy, even if no one knows how
to "share" a kidney) has relented to donor in cases
of individual identification, but serious issues still
remain. National allocation removes organs far
from the place of donation. Not only is there some
(small) increased risk of organ deterioration from
increased transportation time, but also a greater
reluctance of individuals to donate in the first
place. I have greater sympathy with those who are
in my local community than those who live at a
distance. After all, most volunteer and charitable
work in hospitals is done at a local level for local
citizens. The same dynamic works for organ donations, especially when controlled by family members of the recently departed.
The overblown communitarian rhetoric of UNOS
thus reveals the usual weakness of such grandiose
philosophies. It falsely assumes that the rate of collection is wholly unaffected by policies of ultimate
distribution. Even within a world in which sales are
prohibited, the first task is to maximize the number
of organs collected. When no one has reliable information about the relative worth of the lives saved or
sacrificed, distribution is at best a secondary consideration. Yet UNOS acts as the proverbial 900 pound
gorilla, for under the 1986 Budget Reconciliation
Act, which extended its powers, UNOS has a de
facto monopoly over every aspect of organ transplantation.' Every hospital has to dance to the UNOS
tune for all organ transplants, or face the intolerable
3 James Blumstein, "Government's Role in Organ Transplant
Policy," in Organ Transplant Policy, Issues and Prospects 5 (J. Blumstein
& F. Sloan, eds. 1989) contains an excellent summary of the mechanisms involved.
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loss of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, not
only for organ transplants but for all medical services. And UNOS now sets the rules for all transplant programs that are carried on at any center,
regardless of where or how the organs are procured.
In practice a program that does not satisfy UNOS
criteria cannot continue running its transplantation
programs at all. The government does not simply
maintain a registry to help people arrange for good
matches privately. Unfortunately, a benevolent dictatorship exerts monopoly power over organ-transplantation and persists in holding to its no sale policy in the face of enormous and predictable shortages.
UNOS also is unable to respond to other problems of organ distribution. With payment banned,
who gets organs? Most often the experts rely on systems of so-called antigen matchings - to see
whether the recipient is more likely to prosper with
the organ than some rival claimant to it. Antigen
matching is the ultimate criterion of the technocrat. A perfect six-antigen match prevails over any
less than perfect match. Thereafter, five may be preferred to four, four to three and so on down the line.
Lotteries may be used to break ties. But all soft-criteria, such as matters of past conduct, family situation, and prospective benefit are quite simply too
hot to handle.
Even within this limited frame of reference,
ambiguities abound. Unhappily, the "neutral" criterion of antigen matching carries with it an unintended but well-established race spin. On balance
white kidneys do better in white recipients; and
black kidneys do (relatively) better in black recipients - although overall white survivorship rates are
higher. Yet the suspicion or alienation of potential
black donors and their families is so high that a far
higher percentage of potential white donors give
than potential black donors. A policy of local preference might increase the rate black contributions.
Worse still, the percentage of blacks who suffer
from various kidney related diseases is far higher
than the percentage of whites who suffer from the
same conditions.The numbers are striking. If blacks
constitute about one-eighth the total population,
then (as of 1988 at least) they constituted about
thirty-five percent of the population (about 37,000
out of 104,000) with end state renal disorders
(ESRD), the condition that triggers the transplant
6

or confines people to a fate almost as bad as death
itself - dialysis. Yet by the same token about seven
percent of the needy white population receive kidney transplants each year, and only about five percent of the black population (4900 white recipients
versus 1,500 black recipients). Still requiring an
even distribution of black and white recipients will
increase the overall number of deaths. But the size of
any increase is subject to sharp disagreement, now
that immunosuppressive drugs increase the success of
donations with imperfect matches.
Some ethicists have proposed that blacks be
allowed to designate other blacks as their preferred
organ recipients.' However, it is far less clear
whether these same ethicists would accord similarly
situated whites (or for that matter Protestant,
Catholics or Jews) an identical privilege.
Unfortunately the entire issue will be caught up in
the endless debate between the color-blind and
affirmative action views of the antidiscrimination
principle. These weighty issues cannot be resolved
here, save to say that both sides of the current
debate are wrong and for the same reason: they support different forms of state regulation on matters
properly reserved to the domain of individual
choice. All persons should be allowed to choose the
objects of their affections, both for individual and
for class gifts, with organs as with common stock.'
The current gridlock is therefore likely to continue
as debate over organ donations are waged in the
wrong forum.
Bringing over the antidiscrimination debate into
the transplantation area does have one predictable
consequence: it makes it possible to take dead aim at
foreigners seeking organ transplants at an American
hospital. UNOS policy makes organs a national
asset, not a world-wide one. While this nation
includes permanent aliens from all ports of entry, it
does not include those opportunists who come to our
shores in search of reliable organs. Yet hospitals love
to place them at the top of the queue, because the
money that cannot be legally paid to the organ

Wayne B. Arnason, "Directed Donation - The Relevance of
Race," Hastings Center Report 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1991)
5 For a fuller account of the mischief of the antidiscrimination laws
in employment, see Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case
Against Employment Discrimination Laws (1992).
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donor can now be paid to the transplanting hospital,
free of any and all Medicare restrictions. Yet rich
foreigners are not a protected class, nor do they vote,
and so first UNOS and then the Congress bears the
brunt of a heavy America first campaign: American
organs for American bodies. UNOS already subjects
any transplant center to a special review if more
than ten percent of its organs are transplanted into
foreign individuals and Congress is now considering
more stringent restrictions. Free trade respects no
foreign boundaries, but the politics of communitarian benevolence is confined to local borders.
A FUTURES MARKET IN ORGANS?

Current organ policy fails on two fronts. The forces
of altruism work too spasmodically to generate an
adequate supply; and government-controlled allocations works on impersonal, technical, and arbitrary
criteria that have no independent legitimacy of their
own. If ever there was a time to rethink a major portion of government policy, that time is now. The
one policy alternative that deserves the most forceful
endorsement is the one legally banned and ethically
condemned: markets. A perfect negative fit.
To those lacking refined ethical sensibilities, a
shortage in organs, like tomatoes or rental housing,
is simply evidence of a malfunctioning market. No
surprises here, just the usual unfortunate consequences -

queues and intrigue -

when markets

are banned. To relieve this situation, a number of
able scholars have already proposed limited market
systems for organ transplants. Henry Hansmann
and Lloyd Cohen independently suggested the creation of a futures market in organ transplants, that
is, pay the organ donor for giving the government
or some private firm the right to harvest that organ
in the event of death. Hansmann wants the donor
to receive an annual reduction in health care premiums.6 Cohen prefers a lump sum payment at
death to those persons designated by the decedent.'
This is a good start, but it won't work. Too many

6Henry Hansmann, "The Economics and Ethics of Markets for
Human Organs," in Organ Transplantation Policy: issues and Prospects,
(eds.5 James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan).
Lloyd Cohen, "Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
Virtues of a Future Market," 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
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years and obstacles lie between the 1993 promise
and a possible death a generation later. Who will
be around to see that its terms are. rigorously
enforced? And no matter what the contract says,
the system of multiple vetoes will allow lone relatives to block desired transfers. After death no one
has absolute property rights in his or her own body,
for no matter how many times we amend the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to say they do, transplant surgeons and bereaved families beg to differ.
The living cannot secure control of their own bodies after death. So long as that belief system holds
true, no market can emerge, even if legal prohibitions on organ sale are removed. Nor do the
Hansmann and Cohen proposals respond to the
gridlock created on the recipient side of the market.
UNOS does the collecting and allocation.
AN OPEN MARKET IN LivE ORGAN TRANSFERS

Only one alternative is left, and it might work.
Forget the medical ethicists: allow market sales of
organs by living donors to unrelated parties. The proposal will stop the shortage in needed hearts. It
might help a bit with liver transplants now that
partial transplants are viable, especially for children. But open markets could make a big dent for
the most acute shortage: kidneys. Purchased transplants present no greater technical difficulties and
no greater risks than live kidney donations between
unrelated parties, for the cash going in one direction has little to do with the organ that travels in
the opposite direction.
Before yielding to any predictable howls of ethical revulsion, note some of the advantages. First, it
generates gains from trade. No one would doubt
that several weeks of rest and rehabilitation, the
loss of a rib, and an ugly scar are best avoided. But
these costs are small next to the sustained suffering, endless dialysis, morbidity, loss of life, and
family burdens. Everyone knows that the loss in
utility to the donor is far smaller than the gain in
utility to the donee. Could we imagine unleashing
the forces of altruism if recipient gains were smaller
than donor losses?
Yet here is the rub. It is one thing to speak of
aggregate gains. It is quite another to speak of gains
shared by both parties. With live altruistic dona9

tions, all the tangible gains go in one direction and
all the tangible losses go in the other. There is a
classic divergence between private loss and social
gain that cries out for redress. Compensation paid
from the gainer to the loser is the best way to redress
that private imbalance. Once the net social gain is
shared by both parties, then the level of transfers
should increase because the gain from transferring
(not donating) increases as well. This is not the
most subtle and profound account of human motivation, perhaps, but it is the most reliable.
A second hidden benefit of live transfers is that it
reduces the fear of undue influence and coercion so
likely in close family situations unless side payments
can be made to help out the donor. But an expectation of mutual gain reduces the need for informal
coercion, and hence the likelihood of its use. The
ethicists are right to worry about coercion, but for
that reason they are wrong to deplore the payment
system that helps achieve that end.
Live organ sales also overcome the bane of future
markets, the huge temporal gap between contract
formation and contract performance. Now cash is
paid on the barrelhead when the operation takes
place. Property rights are no longer indefinite or
insecure. The person who does not own his body
after death can control the disposition of organs during life. He can make an intelligent decision at peak
competence: no more frantic efforts to persuade
shocked and grieving family members to be altruistic
at the time of their greatest loss. Instead, the
extended family is kept at a distance, and calculations and determinations can be made in a less pressured setting; for the organ will keep quite well until
its owner decides, with or without consultation, to
sell. So long as there are a substantial number of
buyers and sellers, fraud and foul play should be
effectively curbed and controlled. There is too
much information on the going rate for someone to
take advantage.
Most importantly, these changes are likely to
boost supply. Don't ask whether you would sell your
organs. You may be no more likely to do that than to
commit murder. But just as criminal sanctions influence those closest to the edge, so too our organ markets will respond to those most likely to donate for a
price. Millions of people have good organs and
strong constitutions. If even a small fraction of one
10

percent of them sell, the shortages in question, at
least for kidneys, will be over. And the donor is protected as well for if something goes wrong with his
remaining kidney, he too has a chance to return to
the market at some later time.
This market in live organs sales obviates virtually
all of the objectionable features of the current system of allocation. Foreigners are not subject to discrimination or exclusion. No board sits in judgment
to decide who is the most worthy recipient.
Lotteries could be a thing of the past. And persons
with inferior technical matches can still pay the
going price even if they are unable to persuade wary
bureaucrats of the strength of their claim.
THE OBJECTIONS TO MARKETS

So with all the generative power of market, why
then the opposition? It is possible here to identify
two separate traditions that have opposed the
development of markets for organ transplant. One
stresses natural rights, and the other the communitarian tradition.
Unnatural acts. The ablest exponent of this
modern tradition is Leon Kass who has raised a wide
variety of objections to the sale of organs, either at
death or during life.8 Kass is extraordinarily uneasy
about his position, and candidly admits that if the
life of his daughters were on the line, he would put
aside his philosophical misgivings and participate in
such a market if he thought he could save their lives.
On the general issue, Kass should follow his instincts
and not his own arguments, which are nuanced and
difficult to summarize. At the deepest level, his view
is that the sale of an organ is an unnatural act
because it flies in the face of the ends of all organisms, namely, their own flourishing and survival.
Transfer of organs during life is regarded as a form of
self-mutilation and partial murder; and at death it
defiles the integrity of the body and mocks the life of
the person who has died. Taken at one level, Kass's
arguments are so strong that they would preclude
gifts as well as sales, but he distinguishes between
the two cases on the ground that one is motivated by

8 Leon Kass, "Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property and the Price of
Progress," The Public Interest 67 (No. 107, Spring 1992).
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good will while the other is not. For him organ sales
are simply out of bounds, for while individuals own
their bodies, in the sense of having exclusive control
over them, they do not (or should not possess) the
right to dispose of their body parts by contract.
Even if the gain to the buyer is greater than any loss,
subjective or objective, to the seller, the commodification of body parts is just too repellent to tolerate
whatever practical advantages it promises.
It is easy to understand the natural revulsion
toward the sale of body parts. Surely during our dim
evolutionary past, both live and cadaveric transplantations were self-destructive acts. It was natural,
therefore, that some strong revulsion grew up about
them, for that sentiment served to protect transferors (alive or dead) and recipients against the consequences of foolish acts. Technology, however, moves
faster than the glacial rate of change of ingrained
biological attitudes. Now that transplants are both
possible and safe, why give pride of place to a set of
basic instincts that no longer serve their intended
function? The body has developed all sorts of natural
mechanisms to ward of invasion by foreign bodies.
Yet no one wants to ban surgery as an unnatural act
simply because anesthesia and sterile instruments are
required to overcome the body's natural defenses.
We must fight our natural instincts in order to
obtain the gains that modern medicine promises.
The systems of thought that were perfectly congenial to their own time repeatedly need some cautious
revision in the light of changed circumstances. The
principles of gift, contract, and exchange are also
very old, and often defended in natural rights language as well. They should be given their day now
that new techniques have made it possible to breach
the once inviolate body in ways that better serve
human interests. Today's ban on organ transplants
is in reality no more than a misguided sense of paternalism with harmful consequences to both parties to
the transactions. Kass's categorical rejection of voluntary transplants should be rejected even by those
sympathetic with the natural rights tradition of
which he is a part.
Communitarian responses. The communitarian
objections to organ transplantations follow much
the same lines as Kass's arguments. Commodification figures extensively in their overall story as well,
and for their bottom line, communitarians encour12

age gifts as strongly as they reject sale. Their arguments have exerted a virtual stranglehold over public policy, but are, I believe, both mischievous and
wrong, even wrong-headed. Ethicist Thomas H.
Murray of the Case Western Center for Biomedical
Ethics, in an influential piece on the subject, has
best articulated the standard line: "Gifts to strangers
affirm the solidarity of the community over and
above the depersonalizing, alienating forces of mass
society and market relations."' But why and how
does this impersonality happen? Lots of markets
depend on close relations of trust. Legalizing the sale
of organs does not require a donor to be indifferent
to the fate of the donee, or to take only the highest
price for the organ. Gifts do not become illegal
because sales are allowed, and in many contexts
(e.g., extended families) legalizing sales might invite
blended sale and gift transactions.
Nor must markets drive altruism to the fringes of
human life. Hospitals get paid for their facilities
and equipment; transplant surgeons are richly
compensated for their services. Not all this money
comes from lucky transplant recipients. Charitable
donations can be used to pay organ donors as well
as organ transplant teams. The rich have no more
advantage with organs than with surgeons.
Everyone benefits as queues shrink for rich and
poor alike.
Murray says that "wealth is merely a means to an
end, and that not all valuable things can be purchased, among them love, friendship, fellow-feeling
and trust." But when last I looked, market
exchanges were also means to ends. Love and
friendship are not for sale, even though no law as
yet bans that transaction. What is desperately needed is some new effort to end this appalling loss of
life. If no one comes forward to sell organs, then we
have lost little, and can take some small comfort
that no stone has been left unturned. If there are
abuses in the market, first try to correct these without closing down the entire market. But I suspect
that this note of pessimism is misplaced, for the
enormous gains from trade should lead to flourishing markets that are free of most of these problems.

9Thomas H. Murray, "Gifts of the Body and the Needs of
Strangers," 17 Hastings Center Rep. 30 (1987).
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So, the inevitable retort will be: how far would I
go in the sale of human flesh? What about lethal
transplants which require the killing of the donor in
order for the donee to live? Surely I should ban
those, since no rational person would ever sign his
own death warrant. But not necessarily. Let me
recount a tragic vignette from Elizabeth Rosenthal's
New York Times article on solace through transplants. A 48 year-old quadriplegic woman with endstage multiple sclerosis had one wish: to give, not
sell, her organs after her death. After much deliberation, the physicians agreed to wean her from the respirator to die. Several hours later she died, passively. But during this painful death, her internal organs
became useless for transplant from lack of oxygen.
Even the categorical rule against lethal transplants
has its counterexamples. And if she wanted to sell
the organs to leave something for a devoted friend or
her needy child, should that be regarded as immoral?
The moral is that our centralized policy on organ
transplantation, like all centralized policies, misses
the point. I have no doubt that most Americans, like
most people the world over, are drawn intuitively to
positions like Kass's. They are uncomfortable with
organ transplants, and opposed to organ sales.
Cutting out an organ is painful; it is self-destructive
and unnatural; it gnaws at instincts of survival that
predates the emergence of human beings on this
planet. So we shut down a market, and feed our fears.
Yet the stubborn shortages are large and getting larger. Do we want a set of unpersuasive ethical objections to seal the needless death of thousands?
Perhaps live organ sales will help. If so, then we
should ignore our present squeamishness. Too many
lives are at stake to do anything less.
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